

Message Text

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 05568 01 OF 03 201111Z

16

ACTION EA-09

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00

USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSC-05 PA-01

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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8383

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 1 OF 3 SEOUL 5568

FOR EA/K

EO 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, KS

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S COMMONWEALTH SPEECH

1. THE FOLLOWING IS SUGGESTED TEXT OF AMBASSADOR'S
COMMONWEALTH SPEECH: "TODAY AS WE PONDER THE CRITICAL
PROBLEMS FACING THE WORLD WE CAN BE CERTAIN THAT THERE IS ONE
OF SUCH OVERWHELMING IMPORTANCE FOR BOTH THE SHORT AND THE LONG
TERM AS TO REQUIRE OUR IMMEDIATE ATTENTION. I REFER TO THE
ENORMOUS GAP BETWEEN THE LESS DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
OF OUR GLOBE.

2. "THIS DISPARITY HAS ALREADY CAUSED SERIOUS STRAINS IN THE
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE INDUSTRIALIZED--OR INDUSTRIALIZING--
NATIONS AND THE LESS-DEVELOPED WORLD. THE GAP IS SO WIDE,
AND GROWING IN SOME CASES, THAT IT RAISES SERIOUS QUESTIONS
AS TO WHETHER THE LESS DEVELOPED CAN MAKE THE GRADE.

3. "I THINK THAT FOR MANY OF THE ANSWERS TO THIS
QUESTION, WE MUST LOOK TO NORTHEAST ASIA. OUTSIDE THE WEST,
THE ONLY REGION AS A WHOLE WHICH HAS MEANINGFULLY

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PAGE 02 SEOUL 05568 01 OF 03 201111Z

ENTERED THE INDUSTRIAL AGE IS NORTHEAST ASIA.

4. "IT IS ONLY THE NATIONS OF NORTHEAST ASIA--JAPAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA--WHICH HAVE TAKEN THAT GIGANTIC STEP FORWARD WHICH REMOVES THEM FROM THE ROSTER OF LESSER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND PLACESTHEM ON THE LIST OF NATIONS WHICH HAVE EITHER REACHED THE STAGE OF SELF-SUSTAINING ECONOMIC GROWTH OR SOMETHING VERY CLOSE TO IT.

5. "BEFORE THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BROUGHT IT INTO THE INDUSTRIAL AGE AND PROPELLED IT TO THE STAGE OF SELF-SUSTAINING ECONOMIC GROWTH, KOREA WAS A COUNTRY RULED BY A RURAL, LANDED ELITE WITH A FUNDAMENTALLY CONFUCIAN MIND-SET AND A RIGIDLY HIERARCHICAL SOCIETAL STRUCTURE. TODAY IT IS A FULL-FLEDGED MEMBER OF THE MODERN WORLD, GOVERNED BY A NEW ELITE OF LARGELY WESTERN-TRAINED, PRAGMATIC MEN AND WOMEN WHO HAVE FULLY ACCEPTED WESTERN MANAGEMENT METHODS AND TECHNOLOGY IN ADDITION TO MODERN PLANNING TECHNIQUES. IT IS DYNAMIC AND OUTWARD-LOOKING, AN ECONOMIC POWER IN ITS OWN RIGHT, SECOND ONLY TO JAPAN IN NON-COMMUNIST ASIA.

6. "THIS TRANSFORMATION IN SOUTH KOREA HAS BEEN RAPID--WE CAN PROBABLY DATE ITS MAJOR THRUST FROM 1965. BUT BECAUSE IT HAS CONFRONTED AND CONFLICTS WITH MANY SOCIAL AND CULTURAL VALUES WHICH WERE DEEPLY IMBEDDED IN ANCIENT KOREAN TRADITION, IT HAS BROUGHT WITH IT TRAUMA--IN SOME CASES SEVERE.

7. "AS MODERN AND POWERFUL AS KOREA HAS BECOME, ITS PEOPLE ARE STILL STRUGGLING TOWARD A NEW CULTURAL IDENTITY WHICH WILL PRESERVE THE COMFORTING TRADITIONS OF CONFUCIANISM AND STILL PERMIT THE PROCESS OF MODERNIZATION TO CONTINUE. THE HIER-ARCHICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SOCIETY HAS BEEN ALTERED BUT WILL PROBABLY PERSIST BECAUSE, AGAIN, IT PROVIDES SATISFACTION FOR THE PEOPLE. THE VILLAGE STRUCTURE IS CHANGING, NEW LEADERSHIP AND GRASS ROOTS PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT IS EMERGING. WESTERN LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC VALUES ARE FAR FROM ALIEN TO KOREA, BUT THEY ARE NOT YET FULLY ACCEPTED BY ALL KOREANS, OR DEEPLY IMPLANTED. I PERSONALLY LOOK FOR A SYNTHESIS--ONE WHICH WILL PRESERVE MANY OF THE STRONG POINTS IN THE KOREAN VALUE SYSTEM AND STILL PERMIT INCREASING PARTICIPATION BY THE PEOPLE IN THE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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PAGE 03 SEOUL 05568 01 OF 03 201111Z

PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT.

8. "THERE IS ONE KEY POINT TO REMEMBER, HOWEVER, AND THAT IS THAT THE KOREAN PEOPLE HAVE SHARED RELATIVELY EQUITABLY IN THE DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESS. ITS BENEFITS HAVE NOT BEEN LIMITED TO THE FEW.

9. " IN 1953 AT THE END OF THE KOREAN WAR, PER CAPITA GNP

WAS \$67. BY 1965 IT WAS \$106. LAST YEAR IT IS \$531 AND I FULLY EXPECT KOREAN PLANNERS TO REACH THEIR GOAL OF \$1,284 IN 1981. LAST YEAR FOR THE FIRST TIME, FAMILY INCOME IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR SURPASSED FAMILY INCOME IN THE CITIES--REVERSING THE CLASSIC PATTERN. THESE FIGURES ARE STILL LOW, BUT COMPARED TO WHERE KOREA WAS AND MOST OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD STILL IS, THEY ARE REMARKABLE.

10. "WHILE THE TRANSFORMATION OF KOREAN RURAL LIFE IS ALMOST REVOLUTIONARY, OVERALL STATISTICS ON THE ECONOMY ARE EQUALLY AS IMPRESSIVE. SINCE THE EARLY 1960'S THE KOREAN ECONOMY HAS EXCEEDED EVEN THE MOST OPTIMISTIC EXPECTATIONS AS AVERAGE ANNUAL REAL GROWTH OF GNP HAS SURPASSED 9 PERCENT. IN THE LAST THREE YEARS ITS DOMESTIC SAVINGS HAVE GROWN TO AVERAGE 20 PERCENT OF GNP WHICH, WITH ITS TRULY IMPRESSIVE RECORD IN REDUCTING THE POPULATION GROWTH RATE AND ITS LOW CAPITAL-OUTPUT RATIO, HAVE PLACED IT AMONG THOSE COUNTRIES WHIHH, HAVE ACHIEVED SELF-SUSTAINING ECONOMIC GROWTH. PARTICULARLY IMPRESSIVE WAS KOREA'S RECORD OF ALMOST 8 PERCENT GROWTH DURING THE DIFFICULT YEARS OF THE OIL CRISIS AND WORLDWIDE RECESSION, 1974 AND 1975.

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 05568 02 OF 03 201156Z

43

ACTION EA-09

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00

USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSC-05 PA-01

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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8384

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 2 OF 3 SEOUL 5568

11. "CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT AT THIS PACE WILL BRING MANY CHANGES.

FOR ONE, WE WILL SEE A CONTINUATION OF THE ALREADY WELL-ESTABLISHED TREND AWAY FROM CREDIT AT CONCESSIONAL TERMS TO CREDIT AT COMMERCIAL RATES. THIS HAS ALREADY TAKEN PLACE. THE UNITED STATES SUPPLIES NO MORE GRANT ECONOMIC AID TO KOREA. ITS CREDIT NOW COMES LARGELY FROM INTERNATIONAL LENDING AGENCIES AND COMMERCIAL SOURCES. "SECONDLY, THE RAPID PACE OF DEVELOPMENT WILL MEAN A FAR MORE SELF-RELIANT DEFENSE POSTURE. AS IN THE CASE OF ECONOMIC AID, WE ARE SUPPLYING NO MORE GRANT MILITARY AID TO KOREA. THEY ARE FUNDING THEIR MILITARY PURCHASES THROUGH FOREIGN MILITARY SALES CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS AND BY USE OF THEIR OWN FOREIGN EXCHANGE. IN FISCAL 1975 KOREANS COMMITTED ONLY 59 MILLION DOLLARS TO COVER FOREIGN MILITARY SALES CREDITS PURCHASES WHILE U.S. GRANT AID WAS 82.6 MILLION DOLLARS. BY FY-1977 THE PRO-PORTION WILL SHIFT DRAMATICALLY WITH COMMITMENT OF SOME 275 MILLION DOLLARS FOR CREDIT SALES AND ONLY 8.3 MILLION IN RESIDUAL GRANT SUPPLY OPERATIONS. NO GRANT MATERIAL AID IS PLANNED FOR FY-77 AND BEYOND. INDEED, THE KOREANS ARE FORMALLY COMMITTED TO MILITARY SELF-RELIANCE IN THEIR RECENTLY-ANNOUNCED DEFENSE FORCE IMPROVEMENT PLAN. "THIRD, THE HIGH KOREAN RATES OF GROWTH WILL ENHANCE THE ALREADY WELL-ESTABLISHED TREND AND LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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PAGE 02 SEOUL 05568 02 OF 03 201156Z

TOWARD OUTWARD-LOOKING DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY. THIS WILL, IN TURN, RESULT IN A FURTHER DIVERSIFICATION OF ITS MARKETS, AND A FURTHER REDUCTION OF ITS RELIANCE ON A FEW ESTABLISHED SOURCES OF SUPPLY FOR RAW MATERIALS. AND IT WILL ALSO MEAN INCREASING OPPORTUNITIES FOR AMERICAN SALES AND INVESTMENT.

12. "JUST BEFORE I LEFT KOREA, I SAW THE FIRST OUT-LINES OF THE FOURTH FIVE YEAR PLAN. I WAS STRUCK BY THE CONCENTRATION ON SOCIAL WELFARE AND INFRASTRUCTURE IN THIS PLAN. THE KOREANS QUITE CLEARLY DO NOT INTEND TO PROCEED WITH DEVELOPMENT AT HIGH RATES ONLY TO END UP A QUARTER OF A CENTURY LATER WITH PROBLEMS OF POLLUTION, UNREALIZED CITY-PLANNING, LACK OF WELFARE AND HEALTH SERVICES AND THE LIKE. THEY ARE MOVING TO SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS TODAY--WHILE THEY CAN STILL BE SOLVED.

13. "GIVEN THIS TYPE OF INTELLIGENT, FORWARD-LOOKING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, WE SHOULD IN A SURPRISINGLY SHORT TIME SEE AN ECONOMICALLY INDEPENDENT AND MILITARILY STRONG KOREA--GOALS WE HAVE BEEN STROMING FOR SINCE THE END OF THE KOREAN WAR.

14. "THERE IS ANOTHER POINT TO BE MADE ABOUT KOREAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY. UNLIKE NORTH KOREA, THE SOUTH HAS GIVEN CLEAR PRIORITY IN THE ALLOCATION OF ITS RESOURCES TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT RATHER THAN TO MILITARY OR SECURITY EXPENDITURE. THIS HAS PROVED TO BE A VERY WISE DECISION INDEED, FOR IT HAS ESTABLISHED A BASIC ECONOMIC FOUNDATION FOR SOUTH KOREA'S SURVIVAL.

15. "ALL THIS HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN A HOSTILE ATMOSPHERE. TO THE

NORTH, SOUTH KOREA FACES AN ADVERSARY WHICH HAS NEVER DISAVOWED THE USE OF FORCE AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING ITS DOMINATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA. IT IS IN THE CRIP OF PERHAPS THE MOST RIGID COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE WORLD WHOSE PREDOMINANT FEATURE IS THE CULT OF PERSONALITY SURROUNDING ITS LEADER, KIM IL-SUNG. IT HAS ACTED, IN THE PAST, UNPREDICTABLY. IT IS A REGIME WHICH HAS REBUFFED ALL ATTEMPTS BY THE SOUTH TO MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE TO LESSEN TENSIONS. INDEED IT APPEARS TO BE DESIROUS OF SEEING TENSION REMAIN HIGH, AND AS ONE EVIDENCE I WOULD CITE THE NORTH KOREAN CONSTRUCTION OF TWO TUNNELS UNDER THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE WHICH SEPARATES THE TWO COUNTRIES.

16. "GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE SOUTH'S ADVERSARY, I CAN ONLY LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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PAGE 03 SEOUL 05568 02 OF 03 201156Z

DESCRIBE THE SITUATION ON THE PENINSULA AS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS, REQUIRING A HIGH DEGREE OF READINESS ALONG THE BORDER. THE OPPOSING MILITARY FORCES, NORTH AND SOUTH, ARE ROUGHLY IN BALANCE WITH NO IMMEDIATE LIKELIHOOD OF MAJOR NORTH KOREAN MILITARY INITIATIVES. THE NORTH KOREANS HAVE CONSTANTLY STRENGTHENED THEIR FORCES ALONG AND BEHIND THE DMZ BUT THE BALANCE HAS BEEN MAINTAINED BY THE PRESENCE OF 42,000 AMERICAN TROOPS IN KOREA. THESE TROOPS CONSIST CHIEFLY OF GROUND AND AIR ELEMENTS.

17. "WHY SHOULD WE STILL BE IN KOREA?

18. "WE ARE IN KOREA PRIMARILY BECAUSE IT IS IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST TO BE THERE.

19. "WE HAVE, OF COURSE, A COMMITMENT TO KOREA. THIS COMMITMENT IS IMBEDDED IN THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY OF 1954 AND BINDS US TO COME TO THE ASSISTANCE OF KOREA, IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES, SHOULD KOREA COME UNDER ATTACK AGAIN. BUT WHAT INTERESTS LAY BEHIND THAT COMMITMENT? ARE THEY STILL VALID TODAY, 22 YEARS LATER?

20. "WE ARE IN KOREA FOR OVERWHELMINGLY IMPORTANT STRATEGIC REASONS. GEOPOLITICALLY, THIS SMALL COUNTRY--ABOUT A QUARTER OF THE SIZE OF CALIFORNIA--LIES AT THE VERY NEXUS OF THE INTERESTS OF FOUR MAJOR POWERS, JAPAN, THE SOVIET UNION, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, AND THE UNITED STATES. HISTORICALLY IT HAS BEEN FOUGHT OVER AND REMAINS TODAY VALUED TERRITORY. THE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA WOULD IMMEDIATELY RAISE SERIOUS QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE DEFENSE OF JAPAN--OUR MAJOR ASIAN ALLY. IT WOULD ALSO BE OF INTENSE INTEREST TO BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA WHICH SUPPORTED THE NORTH KOREANS MATERIALLY AND POLITICALLY IN THE KOREAN WAR. RENEWED HOSTILITIES WOULD IMMEDIATELY RAISE THE CENTRAL QUESTION OF WHETHER THE CONFLICT COULD BE CONTAINED WITHIN THE PENINSULA. THE RISK OF A WIDER

CONFLICT DEVELOPING IS SELF-EVIDENT.

21. "THUS, THE MOST SIGNIFICANT REASON FOR OUR PRESENCE IN KOREA IS TO DETER--AND TO PREVENT--RENEWED HOSTILITIES, ANOTHER ATTACK BY THE NORTH UPON THE SOUTH. OUR PRESENCE THERE IS AN INSURANCE POLICY AND IT HAS WORKED. DETERRING--AND PREVENTING--LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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PAGE 04 SEOUL 05568 02 OF 03 201156Z

RENEWED HOSTILITY IN KOREA IS CLEARLY THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES PRESENCE THERE. BUT SO, AGAIN, IS IT A MAJOR CONSIDERATION FOR JAPAN. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION APPEAR TO SHARE OUR OBJECTIVE OF DETERRING RENEWED FIGHTING IN KOREA.

22. "IN RECENT YEARS, AMERICAN INTERESTS HAVE BEGUN TO BROADEN, TO GROW BEYOND THE ESSENTIAL SECURITY AND STRATEGIC CONCERNS WHICH ARISE FROM KOREA'S PIVOTAL GEOGRAPHIC POSITION BETWEEN THE THREE GREAT AND PRINCIPAL ASIAN POWERS.

23. "WE ALREADY HAVE AN IMPORTANT ECONOMIC STAKE IN SOUTH KOREA AND IT WILL GROW. OUR TRADE WITH KOREA IS SIGNIFICANT AND GROWING. LAST YEAR, KOREAN IMPORTS FROM THE UNITED STATES TOTALED \$1.8 BILLION, AND COULD DOUBLE BY THE 1980'S. THIS IS ALMOST 26 PER CENT OF KOREA'S TOTAL IMPORTS. TOGETHER WITH JAPAN. THE UNITED STATES HOLDS 60 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL KOREAN IMPORT MARKET. THE UNITED STATES IS THE LARGEST MARKET FOR KOREAN EXPORTS--\$1.2 BILLION IN THE FIRST HALF OF THIS YEAR. AMERICAN INVESTMENT IN KOREA IS ALSO CONSIDERABLE AND ADDS ANOTHER DIMENSION TO THIS ECONOMIC INTEREST AS A CLEAR ADD-ON-ON TO OUR SECURITY CO
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PAGE 01 SEOUL 05568 03 OF 03 201238Z

44

ACTION EA-09

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00

USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSC-05 PA-01

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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8385

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 3 OF 3 SEOUL 5568

24. "AND CERTAINLY KOREAN FOREIGN POLICY LEAVES LITTLE TO BE DESIRE IF ONE MEASURES IT AGAINST THE DEGREE TO WHICH IT MESHES WITH OUR OWN INTERESTS IN ASIA.

26. " LIKE ITS SECURITY AND ECONOMIC POLICIES, KOREAN FOREIGN POLICY IS, AS I SAID EARLIER, FUNDAMENTALLY GEARED TO SURVIVAL IN A HOSTILE ATMOSPHERE. SURVIVAL, HISTORICALLY AND TODAY AS WELL, IS THE NAME OF THE GAME FOR KOREA. SOUTH KOREAN FOREIGN POLICY CONTINUES TO FOCUS PRIMARILY ON MAINTAINING KOREA'S ALREADY WIDELY-RECOGNIZED LEGITIMACY AS THE SOVEREIGN POWER IN THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE PENINSULA. CONVERSELY, ONE MIGHT ADD, NORTH KOREAN POLICY IS DESIGNED TO THWART THIS AID AND, AS NOTED, THE NORTH HAS NOT DISAVOWED THE USE OF MILITARY METHODS OR THE TECHNIQUES TO SUBVERSION TO CHALLENGE THE LEGITIMACY OF THE SOUTH.

27. "AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THE SOUTH HAS CLEARLY RECOGNIZED THE DANGER OF OPEN-ENDED, UN-RESOLVED, INDEFINITE TENSION ON THE PENINSULA, CAUSED BY THE COMPETITION BETWEEN THE TWO VASTLY DIFFERING SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT EXISTING THERE. AND IT HAS TAKEN SERIOUS STEPS TO REMOVE OR, AT LEAST, LESSEN THAT TENSION. SOUTH KOREA'S ATTEMPTS TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH THE NORTH, A
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PAGE 02 SEOUL 05568 03 OF 03 201238Z

DIALOGUE WHICH MIGHT CONCEIVABLY LEAD TO SETTLEMENT OF DIFFERENCES AND EVENTUAL REUNIFICATION, HAVE BEEN CONSISTENTLY REBUFFED BY THE NORTH. SO HAVE ATTEMPTS TO PROVIDE FOR MORE HUMANITARIAN ENDS SUCH AS VISITS BETWEEN FAMILIES DIVIDED BY A WAR WHICH WAS FOUGHT 26 YEARS AGO--QTH TILVSWY WERE HELD UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE RED CROSS ORGANIZATIONS OF EACH SIDE. THESE, TOO, HAVE SHOWN LITTLE PROGRESS BECAUSE OF NORTHERN INTRANSIGENCE.

27. "AS A PART OF ITS OWN EFFORT TO LESSEN TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND THUS INSURE ITS OWN SURVIVAL, SOUTH KOREA HAS COOPERATED IN INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS AT THE UN TO SEEK TO RE-ESTABLISH DIALOGUE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH AND TO REDUCE TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. SECRETARY KISSINGER HAS EXPRESSED AMERICAN WILLINGNESS TO ENTER INTO A CONFERENCE OF THE POWERS MOST CONCERNED WITH PEACE ON THE PENINSULA.

29. " RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES, HOWEVER, ARE NOT WITHOUT THEIR PROBLEMS.

30. "FROM THE KOREAN STANDPOINT, I THINK THE PRIMARY PROBLEM IS ONE OF CONFIDENCE. KOREANS QUESTION THE AMERICAN WILL AND PURPOSE, THE DETERMINATION OF AMERICA TO EXERT ITS INFLUENCE IN KOREA AND ELSE WHERE AS A WORLD POWER AND TO ASSIST IN THE MAINTENANCE OF WORLD PEACE. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND KEY AND

INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS HAVE BEEN AT PAINS TO REASSURE THE KOREANS OF THE VALIDITY OF OUR COMMITMENT TO THEM. BUT OUR DEPARTURE FROM VIETNAM CAME AS A GREAT SHOCK TO THE KOREANS.

31. "FROM THE AMERICAN SIDE, THE GREATEST SINGLE ISSUE IS HUMAN RIGHTS.

32. "IT SHOULD BE QUITE CLEAR, AS SECRETARY KISSINGER SAID IN CHILE RECENTLY, THAT THE QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN OUR FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS. AS A DEMOCRATIC NATION, WE MUST BE CONCERNED BY THESE ISSUES.

33. "WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR--PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY--THAT, AS BOTH SECRETARY KISSINGER AND UNDER SECRETARY HABIB HAVE RECENTLY SAID, WE ARE NOT HAPPY WITH WHAT HAS HAPPENED RECENTLY IN SOUTH KOREA. BOTH IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATELY WE HAVE MADE OUR VIEWS KNOWN
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PAGE 03 SEOUL 05568 03 OF 03 201238Z

TO THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT--STRONGLY AND WITHOUT EQUIVOCATION.

34. "THE IMPACT OF THE KOREAN GOVERNMENTS'S ACTIONS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES HAS LIKEWISE BEEN STRESSED.

35. "AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER--AND AGAIN I AM QUOTING SECRETARY KISSINGER, "...WE CANNOT LOSE SIGHT OF OUR BASIC CONCERNS OVER THE SECURITY SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND ITS IMPORTANCE TO THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE AREA." WE CANNOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN THE MILITARY BALANCE IN KOREA TO INSURE THE SURVIVAL OF SOUTH KOREA. AND WE CANNOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE SUPPORT WHICH IT PROVIDES TO OUR SECURITY OBJECTIVES IN KOREA, JAPAN AND EAST ASIA GENERALLY.

36. "I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT OUR BASIC SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IS NOT AN ISSUE BETWEEN THE PRESENT KOREAN GOVERNMENT AND THOSE WITHIN KOREA WHO ARE THE GOVERNMENT'S MOST OUTSPOKEN AND HARSHTEST CRITICS.

37. "THERE IS, HOWEVER, A BROAD AWARENESS IN KOREA OF AMERICAN CONCERNS REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS. WHILE AMERICAN IDEALS OF HUMAN DIGNITY AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN ARE SHARED, THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT OF TODAY CONSIDERS ITS FIRST PRIORITIES TO BE SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT AND EFFECTIVE AND TIGHT MANAGEMENT OF ITS LIMITED RESOURCES. THE GOVERNMENT HAS CONCLUDED THAT TOO GREAT A DEGREE OF PUBLIC DEBATE ON SENSITIVE POLITICAL ISSUES COULD GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF DISUNITY WHICH THE NORTH MIGHT INTERPRET AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS AND INCREASE THE RISK OF MISCALCULATION BY THE NORTH. THERE ARE THOSE WHO MAY QUESTION THIS JUDGMENT, BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO QUESTION THE RIGHT OF THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT, AS A SOVEREIGN POWER, TO MAKE ITS OWN DETERMINATIONS ON ITS SECURITY.

38. "TO SUM UP NOW--

39. "WE SEE IN KOREA ONE OF THE THREE NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES OF NORTHEAST ASIA WHICH HAS ENTERED THE INDUSTRIALIZED AGE, AND PROVIDES BY ITS EXAMPLE A SOURCE OF ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE LESS-DEVELOPED WORLD.

40. "WE SEE A COUNTRY INCREASINGLY ABLE TO BEAR THE COSTS OF LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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PAGE 04 SEOUL 05568 03 OF 03 201238Z

ITS OWN DEVELOPMENT AND DEFENSE WITHOUT OUR HELP.

41. "WE SEE A COUNTRY UNDER THE CONSTANT THREAT OF ATTACK OR SUBVERSION FROM AN UNPREDICTABLE ADVERSARY WHICH COULD ENDANGER WORLD PEACE.

42. "WE ALSO SEE A COUNTRY READY TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH ITS ADVERSARY TO LESSEN TENSIONS IN ONE OF THE MOST STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT AREAS OF THE GLOBE. WE SEE A COUNTRY IN WHICH AMERICA HAS VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS.

43. "WE SEE A COUNTRY WHOSE POLICIES IN MANY KEY RESPECTS MESH WELL WITH OUR OWN.

44. " WE SEE A COUNTRY WITH WHICH, THROUGH TRADE AND INVESTMENT, WE WILL BE INCREASINGLY MORE CLOSELY LINKED.

45. "AND WE SEE A COUNTRY STILL IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING ITS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS TO ATTUNE TO MODERN REALITIES.

46. "WE MUST CONTINUE TO EVIDENCE OUR CONCERN FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF BASIC HUMAN VALUES. BUT ABOVE ALL, WE MUST BENEFIT FROM THE LESSONS OUR PAST INVOLVEMENTS IN ASIA HAVE TAUGHT US: THAT CHANGE IS AS INEVITABLE IN ASIA AS IT IS HERE; THAT CHANGE WILL CAUSE TRAUMA
AND SHOCK, BUT THAT CHANGE IS CAPABLE ALSO OF TRANSFORMING WHOLE SOCIETIES. WE MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT WHAT EMERGES WILL NOT BE COMPLETE REJECTION OF PAST TRADITION AND VALUES. THAT HAS BEEN OUR EXPERIENCE, AND IS HAPPENING IN ASIA NOW. WE MUST FIND THE BREADTH OF VISION AND THE PROFUNDITY OF UNDERSTANDING TO COMPREHEND THE TRANSFORMATION NOW TAKING PLACE IN ASIA."
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